First,
along with so many others in the church today, I thank my God through Jesus
Christ our Lord for the association of leaders and churches of The Gospel
Coalition (hereafter TGC). This association is a strong standard-bearer for the
gospel at a time when the gospel is in so many ways under attack, forgotten, or
abandoned. On TGC council are members who are widely loved and respected as
important leaders in the church: we read and benefit from their books, eagerly listen
to their sermons, and rely on their insights. The leaders of TGC are truly
gifts of Christ to the church.
Admittedly, at the risk of a simplistic reduction of Phillips’ argument, I wonder if, even in our postmodern times, there is no relevance or direction given us in Paul’s sacred charge to Timothy: “Preach the Word” (2 Tim. 4:2)? That is, does Paul say, “Hand out the Scriptures” (though, if possible, that would certainly be an important supplement to preaching the Word)? Such a charge would seem to recommend, again, a silent approach to evangelism (to use D.A. Carson’s phrase, a “gagging of God”). It seems to mean something like, “Don’t talk to people about Jesus, especially if they are relativists. Let them get the gospel on their own, subjectively, by reading the Scriptures and the help of the Holy Spirit.” However, what Paul says to Timothy with this charge to “preach the Word” (or what Peter says with his, “be prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you”—1 Pe. 3:15) seems to be a direct counter to any prescription for a silent or “try it you’ll like it” approach to evangelism. It is, notably (in Paul’s case), even more than directing Timothy to use words or speak to others directly about Jesus—even more than making a claim supported by reasons (though it surely includes as much)—it is, indeed, proclamation.
Before I address my third concern, it might be helpful to lay out some groundwork on which, I believe (at least, in the fundamentals), TGC would agree.
What this underscores is that in God’s communication to people through the Bible certain basic beliefs are critical and must be held together. If we fail to uphold all these beliefs in their integrity, then there is a risk that this communication will break down. These beliefs are: first (as just stated), that God is knowable and has revealed himself through the Bible; second, that the Bible is God’s inerrant Word and true in all that it says (what Scripture says, God says); and, third, that humans can know God through his Word. If because of philosophy or theology, for instance, we conclude that God is by definition unknowable, then this will reduce our regard for the Bible as his Word as well as our confidence that we can know him. Or, if because of a God-denying misuse of science or history, we conclude that there are errors in the Bible, then, again, we will tend to progressively lose confidence that the Bible is the Word of God and that we can truly know God. Finally, if we believe that we as humans cannot know truth or have knowledge in general, then this, also, would cause a loss of confidence that we may know God. This is because, if we are ill-equipped (whether by nature or because of sin) to receive or know God’s Word, what does it matter if God is knowable or has made himself known through an inerrant Bible? In sum, communication between God and people may break down, depending upon artificially created problems (usually derived from philosophy), at any of these three levels of belief which pertain to the nature of God, Scripture, or human knowing.
For this reason, when that part of modernism which has a realistic epistemology claims there are errors in the Bible based, for instance, on what actually happened in history or what it believes is true in science, their approach to truth itself is not wrong. That part of what they are doing is similar to Moses’ test for what is not true prophecy or Peter’s test to show that with his gospel he was not cleverly inventing fictions. What is objectionable about modernists are things like their self-worship, unbelief, rejection of Scripture, and lack of objectivity—not their belief in truth and the attempt (through reasons and evidence) at achieving objectivity itself. If modernists of this stripe truly considered everything and were not actively resisting belief in God and idolatrously worshipping their own minds, they would see that there is solid evidence, for example, that Jesus was raised from the dead. And they would also see that the “errors” in Scripture they so glibly point out are, for any reasonable person, often explainable.
Another thing: is there not a certain partiality in TGC’s telling of the modern-postmodern narrative? Is there not more favor shown to postmodernism than modernism? Isn’t modernism, for the most part, the bad guy in their account? And postmodernism, at least by comparison, the not-so-bad, somewhat-useful guy (as long as he doesn’t get too out of hand)? Has modernism no positive features (for instance: results like refrigerators, cars, and vaccines)? Again, have we not painted ourselves in a corner with a false dilemma? Is there, for instance, no other paradigm for the use of reason than what is on offer in modernism? Does modernism really get to set the terms in that regard? And—that they do get to set the terms—is that not why if a Christian stresses reason or objectivity in persuading unbelievers of the truth of the gospel they get labelled as a “rationalist” or “modernist”? And if they are overly confident about knowing something, they are perceived as having failed to learn the lessons of postmodernity? Have these two historical trends in Western philosophy not become for us as Christians a kind of limiting, interpretive overlay in handling issues pertaining to truth (the place of reason and evidence, subjectivity and objectivity, the nature of facts, etc.)—held in check only by Scripture when we are absolutely pinned to the wall by certain unacceptable conclusions, such as, modernity’s God-denying and autonomous use of reason or postmodernity’s denial that truth exists?
However, while I appreciate the strong stance TGC takes
on the gospel and truth generally, I am concerned about certain things written
about truth itself at their website under the “Vision” statement as well as in
TGC booklet, Can We Know Truth?,
authored by Richard Phillips.[1]
Particularly, I am troubled by the following: first, there is Phillips’ concluding recommendation that in
relating the gospel to postmodern unbelievers, we should not preach or reason
but simply give them a Bible and invite them to get back with us if they have
any questions[2]—what
seems to my mind a sort of “try it, you’ll like it,” relativistic approach to evangelism;
second, I am concerned about the
epistemology behind this approach to evangelism, particularly, as there seems
to be a “bait and switch” strategy at work—that is, TGC seems to bait with a
correspondence theory of truth but actually fishes with a coherence theory,
which, I believe, is quite different from the biblical understanding of truth; third, I am concerned that the TGC in
thus adopting a coherence theory has by logical implication framed its belief
about biblical inerrancy within the same theory and, thus, has: (1) conferred
on that belief an immunity from outside attack at the cost of no longer having
a basis in a verifiable, external reality (the standard historical and
scientific claims must abide by); and (2) departed from the framework of the
correspondence view of truth which is so critical to the 1978 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, particularly as part of the rationale behind the
church’s need to take a strong stand in that regard; fourth, I am concerned, more generally, about the manner in which
TGC subtly (if not confusingly) both criticizes and befriends certain tenets of
modern and postmodern philosophy; more specifically, about TGC’s cluster of
skeptical claims, namely, that (1) due to human finitude truth is subjective,[3]
(2) because of sin “humans are no longer able to know truth truly at all,”[4]
and (3) that there is no “objective epistemological ground” between believers
and unbelievers that “does not require Christians to ignore the lordship of
Jesus.”[5]
These claims and the epistemology behind them, as I hope to demonstrate, are,
again, inconsistent with biblical assumptions.
In sum, these four concerns are interrelated and all pertain to the urgent and timely issue of epistemology (how we understand
knowing): the absence of reasoning or preaching in relating the gospel to
postmoderns (the first concern), the internalization of a correspondence theory
of truth within a coherence theory (the second concern), the departure from the
epistemology of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (the third
concern), and the denial of a reliably knowable universal truth between
believers and unbelievers (the fourth concern).
A Silent, “Try It, You’ll Like It,” Subjective
Approach to Evangelism
As for the first concern, before making his
recommendation of evangelizing postmodernists by simply giving them a Bible,
Phillips tells how Judy Telchin and then later her parents came to believe in
Christ (p. 21). All these conversions involve someone giving an unbeliever a Bible,
inviting them to read it, and then see for themselves whether or not the Bible
is true. The paradigm for evangelism here is (to state the obvious), first of
all, silent in the sense that on the
front end and with respect to the gospel no one is preaching to or reasoning
with an unbeliever from the Scriptures; secondly, it is subjective or relative
in its appeal as the unbeliever is invited to see for themself whether the
biblical gospel is true.
To be clear, that our sovereign Lord at times uses this approach
of private Bible reading in making himself known to unbelievers (he did so in
my own case) is not what I find objectionable. The problem is when offering
someone a Bible is presented as the
method for evangelizing people in our postmodern times. That is, even in such a
context, I would suggest that the Bible still enjoins, generally speaking, both
gospel proclamation (Matt. 28:18-20; Mark 16:15; 2 Tim. 4:2) and reasoning with
people about the Christian hope that is in us (1 Pe. 3:15; Acts 17:2-4, 22-31)
as the abiding norm for evangelism.
Quite frankly, I don’t see how TGC council reconciles
this paradigm for evangelism with
actions of some of its own members (that is, their use of reason, evidence, and
proclamation in relating to the lost).[6]
Needless to say (and to the glory of God!), there seems to be a whole lot more
going on in the TGC’s ministry and among churches in their association than
just handing out Bibles. Accordingly, if TGC’s own actions show their
recognition of the importance of these things, why would they support a booklet
on truth that has as its concluding recommendation a silent, Bible-distribution
approach to evangelism?
The Gospel Coalition’s Claim of Correspondence for
Truth Is Actually Internalized within a Coherence Theory of Truth
With all that said, however, my
second concern goes deeper. It has to do with the epistemology behind such a
recommendation. Ordinarily, when one says (as the council does) “we affirm that
truth is correspondence to reality,” this means that propositions can be
objectively and verifiably tested against reality and thus proven to be true or
false. It also implies that truth is in
some sense universal and accessible to everyone.[7]
No matter what group, culture, or background one may belong to, the same
reality is there and reliably knowable. We might call this “court room
epistemology” or everyday, common sense knowing, because of its assumption that
whenever the truth of a matter is under question, we can often gain the public
clarity we need through facts or evidence.
On the other hand, if only a
specially qualified group of people can know truth (because they know things
others don’t, especially because how
they know things is different), then truth is not what corresponds to reality
but what coheres with what those particular people believe—that is, their
presuppositions as a group. Such an approach to truth reflects a coherence
theory of truth, which may be defined as, “truth is what coheres or is
consistent with everything else we—not
as the public or people in general but as a private or particular
group—believe.”
However, this presents a problem.
Whatever its value in other contexts (such as religion), where public truth is
concerned, such as in a court of law or everyday life, the coherence theory
does not work. The reason is obvious: by definition such a theory does not
claim the kind of neutrality, universality, or objectivity necessary for those
contexts. Coherence truth is private or “for members only.” Hence, it cannot—in
its claim to knowledge and by definition—include everyone. What would happen,
for instance, if a defense attorney employed an argument based on a way of
knowing unique to himself or the defendant? How far would he get in a court of
law? His conclusion might be true for him and his client (his private club, in
that sense), but it would not be true for the rest of those involved in the
trial: the attorney for the prosecution, the judge, the jury, and the public at
large.
It may be helpful to recall that the
coherence theory was formulated specifically due to a prior rejection of the
correspondence theory.[8]
Indeed, the coherence theory serves for many (especially in philosophy) not
only as a counter to the correspondence theory but also a worthy substitute for
it. This does not mean, of course, that there is no coherence of beliefs within
the framework of a correspondence theory. Nor does it mean, on the other hand
(quite importantly in this context), that there is no claim of correspondence
to reality within the framework of a coherence theory. (As I will explain
shortly, this is where I believe TGC’s own claim to correspondence belongs.) It
does mean, however, that with a coherence theory, at no point along the range
of what it claims to know (even when it is most confident) does it propose for
its knowledge the kind of correspondence to reality which, consistent with the
theory so named (and, again, to which coherence is opposed), is objective,
verifiable, and accessible to all.
This is why, of course, knowledge
based on coherence is called “a web of belief.” Knowledge of this sort—in
contrast to the groundedness of correspondence—is, as it were, suspended in
mid-air. Such knowledge, though held together, has no connection to the earth
in the sense that it has no foundation in what is generally, reliably, and
verifiably knowable for everyone. A coherence theory, therefore, is an approach
to truth which accommodates what diverse groups, collectives, or cultures
believe sans any direct, objective,
and universal epistemic justification in external reality.
Hence, this theory of truth is
consistent with knowledge regarded as subjective and relative. It is, indeed,
pluralistic or perspectival in nature. This is because its basic assumption is
that, for any particular group, its way
of knowing (distinct from what it
knows that way) uniquely and necessarily conditions what it counts as
knowledge. Consequently, its knowledge is not shared by other groups. Put differently, a coherence
theory holds that there is no one way
of knowing available to everyone. In order, then, for Group A to convince Group
B to adopt its beliefs, its appeal to truth can only be indirect. That is,
Group A appeals directly neither to what it knows (based on its way of knowing) nor to something
objective and knowable by all (since, of course, it doesn’t believe that things
are known that way) but to its way of
knowing (its presuppositions). With a coherence theory, then, if Group A
wishes to persuade Group B to accept its truths, it does so by, in effect,
making the following proposal: “Please try our way of knowing, and then, perhaps, you will accept what we know—that is, become convinced
of and embrace our truths.”
With that said, I wonder if notwithstanding
its explicit identification with a correspondence theory of truth and rejection
of “truth as nothing more than the internally coherent language of a particular
faith-community,”[9]
TGC actually supports a coherence theory that includes an internal claim to
correspondence. To make this case, I begin with Phillips:
The purpose of this booklet, then, is not to
present an objective epistemology that anyone—Christian or not—would
adopt....Wouldn’t it be better, some will ask, to meet our unbelieving
neighbors on an objective epistemological common ground? That answer is that no
such objective ground exists...[10]
For
the moment, I have intentionally omitted important qualifiers in this
quotation, which I intend to include and address shortly. However, I wish to
underscore in the quotation that in context the denial of an “objective
epistemological common ground” is not what unbelievers are espousing under the
sway of what Phillips elsewhere calls “today’s relativist hegemony.” Rather,
this is Phillips himself speaking. That is, at this point, Phillips is not
accommodating himself for the sake of the gospel to a subjective or
relativistic age. This means (or so I argue) that what is both fundamental and
critical to the correspondence theory of truth itself, namely, the implied
assumption of a reality which can be known and verified by all, is not part of
Phillips’ approach to truth. However, once this assumption is rejected, some
other theory of truth than that of correspondence has to take its place. As I
hope to show, next, that theory is one of coherence.
Now for the qualifiers I left out
from the quotation: after rejecting “an objective epistemological ground” which
is the same, whether one is a Christian or not, Phillips offers an alternative
to that ground, which is an approach to truth based on the Christian faith
itself. The latter, he says, “reflects the core beliefs of our gospel faith,”
“validates our experience as Christian believers,” “presents how we as Christians
answer questions regarding the knowledge of truth,” and honors “the lordship of
Jesus.” Here the implication seems clear that if in presenting the gospel to
unbelievers Christians assume that there is “an objective epistemological
ground” between believer and unbeliever (that is, make a direct appeal to the truth), then they are, in that
particular engagement, failing to honor (at least to some extent) their
Christian faith and their Lord. And, as for the unbeliever with whom we are
speaking about the gospel, there is apparently no basis for communication or
persuasion apart from getting them to first presuppose Christian beliefs in
general. (That is—and in a sense—they
need to believe in order to believe.) Thus we have something quite similar
to my earlier illustration of the coherence theory in action. Group A says to
Group B, “Please try our way of knowing,
and then, perhaps, you will accept what
we know—that is, become convinced of and embrace our truths.”
As for how, specifically, TGC and
Phillips internalize their own claim to correspondence within a coherence
theory of truth, it seems to go something like this. Because of finitude and
sin, humans cannot know truth.[11]
However, when someone is regenerated, they are able to understand the Word of
God whose perfect knowledge alone
corresponds to reality. The regenerate, therefore, have in this way unique
access to objective truth; however, this comes not directly but indirectly. It
is mediated through God and the Bible as the Spirit imparts understanding to
the heart. Consequently, truth gets defined as what coheres to what God says in
Scripture (again, which is known subjectively by the Spirit) and any claim of
correspondence to external reality is located within that coherence.
Conversely, those who are not regenerate (thus lacking the internal principle
necessary for knowledge) have no reliable, epistemic access to objective truth.
This means that there is a
significant ambiguity in Phillips’ statement: “Prior to giving our witness to
Christian truth, we will often have to present clear Christian views about
truth itself.”[12]
If by a Christian view of truth, Phillips means a correspondence view of truth
(a knowledge, in a sense, accessible to everyone the way other things
ordinarily are) as supported by the Bible, that is one thing. (That doesn’t
seem to be what he is saying.) If, on the other hand, by a Christian view of
truth (or “our witness”), he means (or implies) that truth is itself entirely relative to one’s subjective
presuppositions or perspective, that is another. If he means the latter, he is saying something philosophical not
biblical. He is also, quite significantly, conceding considerable ground to
relativism itself—albeit, in the name of a Christian form of relativism. In
that case, for instance, those postmodern unbelievers who say, “No thank you,”
to our invitation as Christians to, “Please try our way of knowing,” will tend
to walk away feeling—precisely because of this approach—justified and even confirmed in their own relativism.
Now my claim that Phillips is
enlisting a coherence approach to truth is further confirmed by his account of
a conversation between James Boice and a woman on an airplane. As an
unbeliever, the woman had objections to the Christian faith.[13]
However, Boice kept asking her, “But is it [the Christian faith] true?”
Phillips asks us to suppose that she was a relativist and did not believe in
truth as a common ground. In context, he is imagining for us a problem we may
face in talking to postmodernists about the gospel. And since we have already
noted that Phillips himself does not
believe in truth as a common ground, this is a bit puzzling, but let us
continue. He then asks: “How, then, are Christians to proclaim truth in a world
that no longer believes in it?” Phillips continues: “The answer to the
challenge of our times is surely not to turn aside from our biblical witness to
argue complicated theories of epistemology and hermeneutics.” Apart from what
might be a questionable assumption that arguing “complicated theories of
epistemology and hermeneutics” constitutes turning “aside from our biblical
witness”—not to mention that he is from the outset already significantly vested
in such “complicated theories”—Phillips’ encouragement (as I highlighted at the
beginning) is for us to simply give this person a Bible, tell how God has met
our own subjective need for truth by sending his Spirit to provide what is
written there, including what it tells us of God’s own Son, Jesus Christ, who
gives understanding to sincere seekers of truth from God’s Word. However,
again, is this not basically saying to that person, “Please try our way of
knowing”? And, as I already indicated, is that not what relativists or those
who support a coherence view of truth say in commending “their” truth to
others?
Of course, it is a wonderful thing,
when someone is willing to receive a Bible from us, especially when they are
intent on weighing whether or not the gospel is true. However, as a general
strategy for bringing the gospel to postmodern unbelievers, I wonder: Is that sufficient? Furthermore, if we
do persuade such people to essentially “believe in order to believe,” what kind
of converts will they be? Did they believe because the Bible and the Christian
faith are true (Boice’s concern)? Or did they believe because they experienced it as true? Did they
separate reason from faith in their conversion? Did they put their minds on
hold, suspend their judgment, in order to believe?
In addition, Phillips says early in
his book that “it will not suffice
[emphasis mine—jnp] to hold forth our Bible and walk friends down the famous
‘Romans Road’ series of evangelistic verses.”[14]
He explains that due to the relativism of our times, we will also need to
answer questions as to why we should accept the Bible as true or why we should
think what is true for us is true for others, etc.[15]
Now I must confess that when I first read this reference to “the famous ‘Romans
Road’ series of evangelistic verses” I wasn’t sure what this meant. I found on
the internet that it involves a series of verses from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans to support the
following truths:
1. Everyone needs salvation
because we have all sinned (Rom. 3:10-12, 23).
2. The price (or consequence) of sin is death (Rom.
6:23).
5. Salvation through Jesus Christ
brings us into a relationship of peace with God (Rom. 5:1; 8:1, 38-39).
As
I read these bulleted points, it occurred to me that if one were to study all
the gospel messages recorded in The Acts
of the Apostles, these “Romans Road” points are all either explicitly or
implicitly expressed there. The only difference is that in the apostolic
presentation of the gospel, we find a consistent pattern of appeal (summarized
in 1 Cor. 15:1-8) to the fulfillment of Scriptural prophecies as well as to
their own eyewitness testimony as apostles to argumentatively support the
conclusion that Jesus of Nazareth is Messiah and Lord. Hence, the “Romans Road”
approach to evangelism is an elaboration of appropriate conclusions related to
and even inseparable from this central conclusion of the apostolic proclamation
of the gospel. As such (I trust this is fair), Phillips may as well have said,
“When it comes to evangelizing those who are postmodern, it will not suffice to
preach what the apostles preached in The
Book of Acts or what Paul commends as the gospel with its evidence and
proofs in 1 Corinthians 15. We should, instead, hand them a Bible and invite
them to experience the truth for themselves.” This also means when Phillips
says (as noted above) that “in many cases” the “Romans Road” approach “will not
suffice,” what in the end he really seems to mean is that it “will not do.” Admittedly, at the risk of a simplistic reduction of Phillips’ argument, I wonder if, even in our postmodern times, there is no relevance or direction given us in Paul’s sacred charge to Timothy: “Preach the Word” (2 Tim. 4:2)? That is, does Paul say, “Hand out the Scriptures” (though, if possible, that would certainly be an important supplement to preaching the Word)? Such a charge would seem to recommend, again, a silent approach to evangelism (to use D.A. Carson’s phrase, a “gagging of God”). It seems to mean something like, “Don’t talk to people about Jesus, especially if they are relativists. Let them get the gospel on their own, subjectively, by reading the Scriptures and the help of the Holy Spirit.” However, what Paul says to Timothy with this charge to “preach the Word” (or what Peter says with his, “be prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you”—1 Pe. 3:15) seems to be a direct counter to any prescription for a silent or “try it you’ll like it” approach to evangelism. It is, notably (in Paul’s case), even more than directing Timothy to use words or speak to others directly about Jesus—even more than making a claim supported by reasons (though it surely includes as much)—it is, indeed, proclamation.
Hence, it seems to me that the
explanation for why there is in Phillips an abandonment of the “Romans Road”
(or, as I propose, apostolic) approach to evangelism or of preaching and
reasoning itself is that activities of this nature are logically consistent
with the correspondence theory of public truth (which Phillips rejects).
However, a coherence theory (which Phillips accepts), as a non-public, private,
or exclusive approach to truth, calls for a different approach altogether. It
is obviously more subjective in nature and logically implies a manner of
relating to people which is more indirect, less confrontive, and gently
encourages people to get things on their own. Hence, instead of the urgent and
passionate, apostolic call (such as one observes consistently in Acts) to consider what the Scriptures
say about Jesus as the Messiah as well as the apostles’ own testimony to the
same (all accompanied with persuasive reasoning, etc.), under a coherence
approach (as we see with TGC’s recommendation), it is the Christian perspective
itself which is presented by handing someone a Bible and praying they will have
a believer’s subjective experience of the gospel as truth.
The Gospel Coalition’s Adoption of a Coherence
Theory of Truth Undermines What It Means to Believe in an Inerrant Bible
Before I address my third concern, it might be helpful to lay out some groundwork on which, I believe (at least, in the fundamentals), TGC would agree.
In Can We Know the
Truth?, Phillips’ quotation from Herman Bavinck that “the finite does not
grasp the infinite” (p. 15) and his point (often associated with Cornelius Van
Til) that human reasoning and biblical content are “analogous” to (that is, similar to but not the same as; see p. 14) God’s reasoning and who he really is as God
are things often heard among Christians, like myself, who are Reformed. The
motive of magnifying God as the infinite God in clear distinction from finite
humans with respect to knowledge is, of course, not only commendable but
appropriate for us as Christians. However, I am sure TGC would agree with me
that it is critical in this regard that we
speak as Scripture speaks. And though the Bible declares things like, “How
unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable are his ways!” (Rom. 11:33),
it also assumes everywhere within its pages that God is knowable as he has made himself known through Scripture and
his Son. It also assumes that we are, therefore, accountable to know him. In
addition, the Bible never says that God’s reasoning is different from (or not
the same as) our reasoning. Hence, when he says, “Come, let us reason together”
(Isa. 1:18), God is neither patronizing nor playing with us. For all bibically
revelational and practical purposes as believers, then, it is appropriate to
think of God as one who reasons the way we do. That assumption is critical to
epistemic confidence in one’s relationship to God (that is, that one is walking
in the truth or reality of who God truly is — 2 John 4).
What this underscores is that in God’s communication to people through the Bible certain basic beliefs are critical and must be held together. If we fail to uphold all these beliefs in their integrity, then there is a risk that this communication will break down. These beliefs are: first (as just stated), that God is knowable and has revealed himself through the Bible; second, that the Bible is God’s inerrant Word and true in all that it says (what Scripture says, God says); and, third, that humans can know God through his Word. If because of philosophy or theology, for instance, we conclude that God is by definition unknowable, then this will reduce our regard for the Bible as his Word as well as our confidence that we can know him. Or, if because of a God-denying misuse of science or history, we conclude that there are errors in the Bible, then, again, we will tend to progressively lose confidence that the Bible is the Word of God and that we can truly know God. Finally, if we believe that we as humans cannot know truth or have knowledge in general, then this, also, would cause a loss of confidence that we may know God. This is because, if we are ill-equipped (whether by nature or because of sin) to receive or know God’s Word, what does it matter if God is knowable or has made himself known through an inerrant Bible? In sum, communication between God and people may break down, depending upon artificially created problems (usually derived from philosophy), at any of these three levels of belief which pertain to the nature of God, Scripture, or human knowing.
As I understand it, when the
International Council on Biblical Inerrancy issued their three Chicago
statements (1978, 1982, 1986), they were concerned (especially in their first
two statements) to address and defend the three beliefs just highlighted as
requisite for full integrity in the communication between God and people. The
main focus of the council, however, was on biblical inerrancy (the second
belief). However (as just indicated), they were not unaware of critical issues
pertaining to human knowing or epistemology (the third belief). For instance,
in their 1978 statement on biblical inerrancy they write:
This authority of Scripture is inescapably
impaired if this total divine inerrancy is in any way limited or disregarded,
or made relative to a view of truth
contrary to the Bible's own [emphasis
mine — jnp]; and such lapses bring serious loss to both the individual and the
church. ("A Short Statement," section 5)
Then
with their second statement in 1982 on biblical hermeneutics, we read the
following:
First, in contrast to contemporary relativism
it is declared that truth is absolute. Second, as opposed to subjectivism it is
acknowledged that truth is objective. Finally, in opposition to existential and
pragmatic views of truth, this article affirms that truth is what corresponds
to reality. (Article VI)
Additionally,
in that same statement in one of their denials they address the problem of
relativism:
WE DENY that Scripture should be required to
fit alien preunderstandings, inconsistent with itself, such as naturalism,
evolutionism, scientism, secular humanism, and relativism. (Article XIX)
I remind TGC council of these things
with which they are undoubtedly familiar in order to stress that if I am right
in my claim above that TGC has embedded its own correspondence theory of truth
within a coherence theory and thereby adopted a Christian form of relativism,
then implicitly TGC has departed from the International Council on Biblical
Inerrancy with respect to the epistemology which in their three statements
frames belief in biblical inerrancy. As far as I know, TGC has not explicitly
addressed this difference but, to my mind, it seems quite significant.
If under a coherence theory we
respond to this world’s charge that the Bible has errors by simply affirming
that everything in the Bible is true and without error because it is God’s Word and if we, thus, exempt ourselves from
applying the same tests for truth we ordinarily apply when truth is under
question in our everyday world, then we are effectively saying to people (at
least, this is what they will hear) that we have accepted a certain religious
view of reality which has no more basis in fact or universal reality than an
empty, fictional world someone has imagined in their own head. Consequently, we
confirm the cultural cliche that Christianity is not about facts but “faith.”
And this, in turn, tends to mean: what
people do in accepting something as true even though they have no basis in
reality for it.
Ordinarily, if someone in our world
claims to have a reality uniquely their own, such as the Jimmy Stewart movie
character named Elwood with his invisible, large, rabbit friend Harvey, do we
not say that they are lost in illusion or their own reality? And is this not because
we believe there is a neutral, universal reality we as humans share in common
which serves as the ground for this determination? Now if a special knowing
available merely by the Spirit in
Christ—that is, not neutral nor available to all and not grounded in any sense (what I will consider
later) in ordinary knowing—is required for faith in Jesus Christ, are we not
saying that believing in and walking with Jesus is a kind of illusion (like
Elwood and his friend) assured to us by
the Holy Spirit? If so, how is this different from a “reality” or “truth” a
person has or attempts to convey to others, let’s say, based on a subjective
experience of “God” from a non-Christian religion or perhaps a drug-induced
“trip” (what Francis Schaeffer was always concerned about)?
When the apostle Peter says, “we did
not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty” (2
Pe. 1:16) and when the apostle John speaks of the Word made flesh as
“that...which we have seen with our eyes, which we looked upon and have touched
with our hands” (1 Jn. 1:1) does this not indicate that the apostles of our
Lord clearly did not exempt the truth of the gospel they preached from the
ordinary, common sense, universal, and objective verification generally applied
to any truth claim in our world? And
is this not, therefore, an implicit, divinely authorized stand against any account of knowing—any
epistemology—which renders the Bible immune to the same kind of test? If
regeneration and the work of the Spirit and the view that “God says it, so it
is true” had been the only recourse the apostles had against the charge that
their message had errors or was not true, would we not see this somewhere in Scripture?
As you know, this is why Francis
Schaeffer denied that the Bible is a “religious book,” if by that we mean that
the Bible is providing an experiential, subjective, and “upper-story” truth
(that is, truth that is factually, publicly, and universally non-verifiable).
For instance, in his No Final Conflict:
The Bible without Error in All that It Affirms, Schaeffer writes:
If we try to separate the religious passages
in the book of Genesis from those which touch on history and the cosmos, the
religious passages are relegated to an upper-story situation. They have been
removed from any connection to space-time verification, and that means no
historical or scientific study can refute them. But it also follows that no
studies can verify them. In short, there is no reason to accept the upper-story
religious things either. The upper-story religious things only become a quarry
out of which to have our own personal subjective, existential, religious
experience. There is no reason, then, to think of the religious things as being
other than in one’s own head.[16]
Admittedly,
what Schaeffer is dealing with here concerns conclusions drawn in liberal
theology based on modern scientific method, as well as existential directions
first in philosophy and then in theology which developed from what was
perceived as the absence of God and the failure of reason. However, as I have
been arguing, in its rejection of an objective truth accessible to everyone, a
coherence theory applied to the Christian faith also reduces the truth which is
the object of that faith to a subjective, “upper-story” experience. Having said
that, I recognize that on the terms TGC employs for that experience, the
objectivity of truth is assured to the believer subjectively by the Holy Spirit
based on Scripture. But in the big picture (and as I will demonstrate further
in a moment), this objectivity is significantly different from that for which
Schaeffer throughout his life argued. And, more importantly, it is different
from the nature of truth as revealed in Scripture.
For instance, when Moses teaches the
people how they may “know [emphasis
mine—jnp] the word the LORD has not spoken” (Deut. 18:21-22), does he say they
should consult merely the inner confirmation of the Spirit in their heart? Does
he say, “It is true, because God says so and God cannot lie—follow your inner
witness”? Does he not, rather, apply an ordinary, common sense, and objective
test, as he says, “If the word does not come to pass or come true, that is a
word that the LORD has not spoken” (Deut. 18:22)? And does this not imply that
however finite and sinful the people were, they could understand what had been
presented as prophecy and they could know historical reality sufficiently and
reliably enough to know the difference between whether a prophecy comes to pass
or not? Is this not a test from God himself, involving an exercise in neutral
knowledge and ordinary reality, which stands outside Scripture itself and which
serves as an objective test, for the same?
With that said (and not to get ahead
of myself), when TGC describes modernism as a view that “unaided human
reason...is able to know truth objectively,” does “unaided human reason” mean
“reason without Scripture”? If so, is this not precisely what Moses is
requiring the people of Israel to do (in the situation just mentioned)? That
is, in this context where the question was whether or not a specific word
claimed as from God truly is so, Moses does not point the people of Israel to
Scripture or another prophetic word as an
aid for reason to determine such. He commands them to use their
“unaided”—in the sense that no Scripture was helping or could help them—reason in the following ways: (1) for
understanding what the prophecy meant; (2) for observing and figuring out
whether the prophecy came true or not; and (3) for concluding that if the
prophecy came true it was from God and if it didn’t, it wasn’t from God. The
logic for the positive case goes like this:
Major Premise: If
a prophetic claim comes true, then it is from God.
Minor Premise:
Prophetic claim A came true.
Conclusion: Therefore, prophetic claim A
is from God. (The claim is legitimate.)
And
the logic for the negative case is the following:
Major Premise: If
a prophetic claim does not come true, then it is not from God.
Minor Premise:
Prophetic claim B did not come true.
Conclusion:
Therefore, prophetic claim B is not from God. (The claim is not legitimate.)
Their
assignment, then, from God through Moses was to determine—based on observation
and reason—the universally accessible, objective truth as to whether or not a
certain prophetic claim truly was so. There was nothing inappropriate, in this
particular case, about using “unaided reason” (reason apart from Scripture) to
test whether prophetic claims were truly from God. They didn’t have (again, in
this particular case) Scripture as either a test or an epistemological
condition by which to make this determination. Furthermore, it would have been
a matter of disobedience if the people had not used their own observation and
reason as the Lord told them to in this case. Hence, what this amounts to is
that by God’s own instructions, a prophetic claim, which if true is God’s truth or potentially written Scripture itself,
must, nonetheless, pass a truth-test in external reality based on human reason
and observation. Notably, this requirement is not “modernism” or “rationalism”
but an ancient, divinely prescribed method for discerning whether or not a
prophetic claim is truly from God.
Apparently, this sort of thing is
what Francis Schaeffer means by “the truth which is behind the truth of
Scripture.”[17] He even makes the controversial claim:
"Truth is not ultimately related even to the Scriptures."[18]
He then defines truth: "truth is
that which is in relationship to what exists and ultimately to the God who
exists."[19] So what is Schaeffer claiming here? Aren't
the Scriptures God's self-disclosure as the God of truth? Do they not give us
objective reality? No doubt, Schaeffer would affirm as much. And, therefore, as
surely as God Himself is truth, even the Creator who makes the conditions
necessary for truth, aren't the Scriptures as God's Word so ultimate as truth
that nothing is behind or foundational to them? That they are themselves as
God's Word the ultimate reference point in, for, and as reality — and
therefore, there is no other reality behind them? At this point, Schaeffer
would say no. Why?
Now this is, it seems to me, a
critically important question. There are respected and well meaning leaders in
the church today who are, thankfully, speaking up for truth but who are
claiming that there is no truth but the
Bible and, hence (by implication), no truth apart from or behind the Bible.
They equate the Bible with truth in such an exaggerated sense that the Bible is
viewed as having the only content which qualifies as truth in general or as all
that can be known with certainty as truth. In other words, the only objectivity
there is for truth is in and by the Bible alone.
Hence, we are back to a correspondence theory internalized within coherence.
That is, when they support a correspondence view of truth, they don’t mean
“truth is what corresponds to reality” but “truth is what corresponds to God’s
Word.” Now the latter is certainly true, but it does not account for the
broader view of truth which Scripture itself everywhere and clearly supports.
Consequently, however seemingly spiritual and God-glorifying it sounds to
claim, in effect, that “truth is what merely
and only corresponds to God’s Word,”
such a claim amounts to an unbiblical, human contrivance. It is important,
therefore, for us to understand that this position has three serious problems:
(1) it overstates the Bible's own claim to be truth; (2) it misrepresents or
contradicts the Bible’s own standard of verification for its truth (such as,
Moses’ test in Deut. 18:21-22); and (3) it indirectly and ultimately undermines
the Bible's own real-world or public status as
truth.
For this reason, when that part of modernism which has a realistic epistemology claims there are errors in the Bible based, for instance, on what actually happened in history or what it believes is true in science, their approach to truth itself is not wrong. That part of what they are doing is similar to Moses’ test for what is not true prophecy or Peter’s test to show that with his gospel he was not cleverly inventing fictions. What is objectionable about modernists are things like their self-worship, unbelief, rejection of Scripture, and lack of objectivity—not their belief in truth and the attempt (through reasons and evidence) at achieving objectivity itself. If modernists of this stripe truly considered everything and were not actively resisting belief in God and idolatrously worshipping their own minds, they would see that there is solid evidence, for example, that Jesus was raised from the dead. And they would also see that the “errors” in Scripture they so glibly point out are, for any reasonable person, often explainable.
In sum, what an immunity to attack
on biblical inerrancy gained through a coherence theory does is diminish the
persuasive, establishing power of both the Bible and its gospel as truth. This
applies not only to outsiders whose salvation we seek but also, the church
itself. One recalls here Schaeffer’s quotation from J. S. Bezzant:
When I am told that it is precisely its
immunity from proof which secures the Christian proclamation from the charge of
being mythological I reply that immunity from proof can ‘secure’ nothing
whatever except immunity from proof, and call nonsense by its name.[20]
That
this immunity is gained through an epistemology which is, as I have called it,
a Christian version of relativism does not alter the point: removing the truth
of the gospel from the realm of universally knowable truth (court room
epistemology, every day knowing, etc.) does that truth no favor but actually
undermines it as truth.
That is, biblical inerrancy has
always been about whether in having Scripture we indeed have God’s infallible
truth, where fallibility is measured by what we are ordinarily able to verify
as true or false. Christians who are taught that there is no universally
knowable reality, particularly, as a test of biblical truthfulness, will also
know intuitively that such a Bible thus disconnected from reality could be the
product of human imagination. In addition, they will know, similarly, that all
their beliefs based on the Bible (their Christian worldview) are no more
verifiable than other secular or religious beliefs about the world. Hence,
instead of, “How firm the foundation
[laid for their faith]” they will know the words should be (as certain
postmodern Christians believe), “How infirm
the foundation.” My point is that biblical inerrancy as framed by a
correspondence view of truth (what we see in the statements issued by the
International Council on Biblical Inerrancy) has as part of its central aim the
destruction of any approach to faith or God’s Word which removes the Bible from
an ordinary, reliably knowable connection with external reality. Douglas
Groothuis puts this eloquently:
When objective truth is removed, the
community becomes merely self-referential and ultimately autistic. It has its
web of beliefs; it engages in various practices. But it cannot be said that the
community reflects objective realities. This leaves members of the community
with no compelling reason to adhere to these beliefs. What are these beliefs
about, if not something outside of the community that gives it its compelling
relationship to reality?[21]
Admittedly, this is only anecdotal
but in my experience as a philosophy professor at a conservative, Reformed
Christian college which supports biblical inerrancy—where it was also generally
believed (though not stated in their founding documents) among faculty and
students that truth is subjective and knowledge is entirely relative to one’s
perspective—some of our best and brightest Christian young people, like a small
but steady stream, were giving up the faith right under our noses. No doubt
things like that happen at Christian colleges but the point is that if we have
adopted an epistemology that justifies, in terms of knowing external reality, a
groundlessness whether with belief or unbelief—when, in essence, we are
convinced that the Bible on which the Christian faith depends is divorced from
a verifiable, objective, and ordinary reality—only confirmed to our hearts as
truth by the Holy Spirit—then, it should not surprise us that our students are
losing their faith. “They have,” as Douglas says, “no compelling reason to
adhere to these beliefs.” If we keep telling them what they can’t and don’t
know—all the problems with knowing itself—problems foreign to anything
Scripture says—why are we surprised that one day they throw up their hands and
say, “I don’t know if my faith has to do with anything real. So excuse me while
I go my way and spend my time entertaining a different and more interesting
fantasy.” This is why we need—and must have—for biblical inerrancy and the
Christian faith based on God’s Word the correspondence approach to truth. As
the church, I am sure TGC would agree with me that we cannot afford to play the
philosophers’ games about something so infinitely precious as truth. Groothuis
issues an important and solemn warning here:
Therefore, the correspondence view of truth
is not simply one of many options for Christians. It is the only biblically and
logically grounded view of truth available and allowable. We neglect or deny it
to our peril and disgrace. Truth decay will not be dispelled without it.[22]
We have now come to my fourth and
last concern, as stated in the heading below.
The Gospel Coalition Has Both Criticized
and Befriended Certain Tenets of Modern and Postmodern Philosophy and in Doing
So Has Compromised a Biblical Understanding of Truth
Boice, Sproul, and Schaeffer
First, a more general comment. In
his Can We Know the Truth?, Phillips
enlists for various contexts the help of James Boice, R. C. Sproul, and Francis
Schaeffer. While I am thankful that Phillips includes them, I am not quite
certain why. For readers unfamiliar with these names, it might seem that this
is a gesture of respect, even deference, on Phillips’ part. But it also may
seem that Phillips, perhaps unintentionally, is implying that Boice, Sproul,
and Schaeffer would to some extent countenance Phillips’ beliefs, such as,
truth is subjective, or Christians should employ a “try it you’ll like it”
approach to evangelizing postmoderns, or that there is no objective
epistemological ground between a believer and unbeliever. As no doubt TGC
council members know, this certainly is not the case. For example, James Boice
opens his booklet, Does Inerrancy Matter?,
with a quote from someone who had attended one of his conferences on biblical
inerrancy. In that quote, negative attention is called to the relativistic,
“try it, you’ll like it,” attitude reflected in the comments made by various people
in the audience. These people didn’t see much point in defending biblical
inerrancy. And they did so precisely because they understood truth as relative.
Understandably, for them, defending inerrancy was a moot point. On the other
hand, when Boice speaks to them about how the Bible is without error, he does
so with a belief in objective truth and no doubt similar to what we find in his
booklet on that topic: “This [biblical inerrancy—jnp] is established by
treating it as any other historical record, as, for instance, the works of
Josephus or the accounts of war by Julius Caesar.”[23]
That is, from Boice’s standpoint, there is a reliably knowable, potentially
testable-by-all, objective reality behind the claim that the Bible is without
error. It isn’t merely an internally coherent belief assured by the Holy Spirit
to believers in Jesus. It isn’t true merely because God says so. Obviously,
then, for Phillips (who begins and ends his book with Boice) to seemingly
associate Boice—whether as a gesture of unity and respect or to lend credence
to Phillips’ own denial of such an objective ground—is at best misleading. As
for R. C. Sproul (along with John Gerstner and Arthur Lindsley), he and these
others authored Classical Apologetics: A
Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional
Apologetics, which is itself a classic, textbook refutation of the very
presuppositionalism Phillips assumes in his own view of truth. And, finally,
Francis Schaeffer’s entire corpus of writings amounts to (or assumes) a strong
polemic on behalf of the very “objective epistemological common ground” which
Phillips says does not exist. Curiously, on the other hand, it seems that the
one person to whom Phillips is most indebted in his view of truth is never mentioned
at all: Cornelius Van Til.
The Modern-Postmodern Framework
With that said, I wish to begin this
fourth concern by a consideration of the manner in which TGC frames its
understanding of truth, particularly, with the historical, modern-postmodern controversy
over truth. In the TGC “Vision” statement, we read:
For several hundred years, since the dawning of the Enlightenment, it was
widely agreed that truth—expressed in words that substantially correspond to
reality—does indeed exist and can be known. Unaided human reason, it was
thought, is able to know truth objectively. More recently, postmodernism has
critiqued this set of assumptions, contending that we are not in fact objective
in our pursuit of knowledge, but rather interpret information through our
personal experiences, self–interests, emotions, cultural prejudices, language limitations, and relational
communities.
Similarly,
Phillips also frames his discussion of truth in the same modern-postmodern
terms:
We happen to be living in a historical moment
of tension between two models or theories regarding the knowledge of truth: the
modern and the postmodern.[24]
I
acknowledge, first, that based on Scripture TGC is clearly critical of both
historical trends. My concern, however, is that this way of framing an
investigation of truth tends to imply to a certain extent that these are the two options we must somehow
negotiate with in our understanding of truth. That is, any discussion of truth
(even with Scripture as the final arbiter) seems compelled to do its buying and
selling based significantly on a closed market of ideas represented by the
modern-postmodern controversy.
Now I am well aware that many academics today are quite
taken with this narrowly focused, modern-postmodern narrative, as if it tells
the whole story of reason and truth. Is it not, however, rather simplistic? For instance, why is it that
TGC recognizes nothing historically in our understanding of the concept of
truth prior to the modern period? The manner in which TGC narrates the “crisis”
of truth makes it seem as if the correspondence theory of truth has had only
one face: modern philosophy. Surely TGC does not hold that the modern period
has some special claim on that theory. Does the premodern period—or, better,
mankind’s common sense in general—not count?
I hasten to add that I am aware that TGC intends to
support a biblical version of correspondence truth. It would not be fair,
therefore, to claim that TGC believes the correspondence theory somehow equates
only with modern philosophy. But what puzzles me about TGC’s depiction of this
“crisis” for truth is that it almost seems TGC is claiming the church itself is
somehow involved in it—that because
of our epistemological times, something about the church’s own epistemology
(not just its method of relating to postmoderns) must change. That is, could it
be that whereas Francis Schaeffer would say, “There is no problem of
epistemology for the Christian,” TGC members are, perhaps, clearing their
throat and replying, “With all due respect, Sir, we believe Christians do have
a problem of epistemology”? For instance, the trilogy of TGC’s propositions I
am examining under this fourth concern, namely, truth is (1) subjective because
of finitude; (2) not truly knowable because of sin; and (3) not something
epistemologically shared as common ground between believers and unbelievers. Do
Bible-believing Christians in America or even worldwide generally have such
notions? And where would they get them, if they didn’t have them? Does TGC
believe they would learn them from the Bible? Do these three propositions have
some other source than philosophy?
Another thing: is there not a certain partiality in TGC’s telling of the modern-postmodern narrative? Is there not more favor shown to postmodernism than modernism? Isn’t modernism, for the most part, the bad guy in their account? And postmodernism, at least by comparison, the not-so-bad, somewhat-useful guy (as long as he doesn’t get too out of hand)? Has modernism no positive features (for instance: results like refrigerators, cars, and vaccines)? Again, have we not painted ourselves in a corner with a false dilemma? Is there, for instance, no other paradigm for the use of reason than what is on offer in modernism? Does modernism really get to set the terms in that regard? And—that they do get to set the terms—is that not why if a Christian stresses reason or objectivity in persuading unbelievers of the truth of the gospel they get labelled as a “rationalist” or “modernist”? And if they are overly confident about knowing something, they are perceived as having failed to learn the lessons of postmodernity? Have these two historical trends in Western philosophy not become for us as Christians a kind of limiting, interpretive overlay in handling issues pertaining to truth (the place of reason and evidence, subjectivity and objectivity, the nature of facts, etc.)—held in check only by Scripture when we are absolutely pinned to the wall by certain unacceptable conclusions, such as, modernity’s God-denying and autonomous use of reason or postmodernity’s denial that truth exists?
What am I getting at? Why not begin and stay with Scripture—even
exhaust it as the authoritative resource for understanding the concept or
nature of truth—particularly before we turn to what is happening in philosophy?
Why does it seem that we as Christians are being encouraged by leaders we trust
and respect to pay philosophy’s dues?
Must we tip our hats to the philosophers as the experts on truth, as if what
they have to say about truth as a concept
is our ultimate authority? Did Jesus or the apostles ever have such concern for
what the philosophers say about truth? Or when has the church throughout its
history shown such deference to philosophy, as it seems TGC is doing? And
since, “the supreme judge by which all controversies of religion are to be
determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines
of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are
to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture,”[25]
how does TGC biblically justify their deference to philosophy for an
understanding of the nature or concept of truth?
In one of Phillips’ concluding statements, we find the
following: “The answer to the challenge of our times is surely not to turn
aside from our biblical witness to argue complicated theories of epistemology
and hermeneutics.”[26]
Is it not true, however (and as I’ve already noted), that much of what Phillips
has written about truth (such as, that truth is subjective and that sinful
humans cannot know truth at all) is indeed steeped, even made possible,
precisely by such “complicated theories”? Moreover, that Phillips states his
view of truth in this manner without argument or proof does not mean that such
is obviously true, indefeasible, or non-controversial. For instance, when he
says that apart from sin human knowing (pertaining to truth) is “subjective,”
“partial,” and “selective,” what are Christians to make of such a statement?
Again, where would they go in Scripture to verify this? What would the early church
make of such a statement—particularly, since (as Paul recognizes) not many of
them were “wise” by the standards of their philosophical age (1 Cor. 1:26)? And
what about those “little children” who were not “wise and understanding” and
yet were people to whom our Father, because of his own good pleasure, revealed
the things of the kingdom (Matt. 11:25-26)? What would those people—so simple
and uneducated—have done if Jesus had spoken to them this way about truth? My
point is that if Phillips and the council members of TGC are relying on the
philosophers to argue for the subjective nature of truth (prior to sin), the
inability to know truth at all (due to sin), or the complete absence of common
epistemological ground between believers and unbelievers, then truly (again) it
would seem that through their leadership the Lord’s flock is being led into the
very “complicated theories” Phillips mentions.
Phillips’ Misunderstanding of the Framework Itself
In addition to these problems
related to TGC’s discussion of truth in this limiting modern-postmodern
framework, there are also, as I understand it, some significant problems with
the way Phillips represents this framework itself.
First of all, Phillips in several
places confuses postmodern with modern ideas. This is evident, for instance,
when he says, “Here postmodernity prudently points out that even if there is
real truth, humans may not be able to know truth truly.”[27]
With this statement, Phillips seems not to have considered that postmodernity
entertains no hypotheticals of this nature about the knowledge of reality. The
reason for this is that postmodernity has fundamentally rejected the existence
of reality. It is the modernists who, for the most part, hold that external
reality exists but that our knowledge of such is, first, subjective, and
second, problematic in the sense that it cannot be directly checked against
external reality itself. This is true because many of the modern philosophers
held that all knowledge is mediated through the mind (its ideas or internal
conditions), and the mind (internal reality) itself is so substantively
different from the body or matter (external reality) that we have no assurance
that there is a correspondence between them which could yield reliable
knowledge.
In another place, Phillips says,
“postmodernity correctly points out that actual people are finite and therefore
have a limited, subjective understanding of truth.”[28]
Actually, postmodernity is non-essentialist
in its thinking. Consequently, it does not hold that humans are “finite” or
“limited” or “flawed.” Such would amount to a metanarrative concerning human
nature. When Lyotard speaks of postmodernity’s “incredulity toward
metanarratives,” he means that postmodernity does not believe that there is
anything essentially, abidingly, or ultimately true about anything. All beliefs, accordingly, are humanly
constructed and without transcendent, metaphysical status. Nothing has
substance in itself. This is what is meant by the postmodern saying, “All
truths are fictions.” Hence, one will not find postmodernists making a claim
about human nature, such as, “humans are finite” or “flawed.”[29]
Phillips also says,
The postmodern junta now governing Western
culture holds this relativism as its sole absolute: no one has the right to say
that he possesses the truth absolutely so that others are absolutely wrong.
There may be ‘my truth’ and ‘your truth,’ but the postmodern mind dogmatizes
against anyone claiming dogmatically to possess the truth (except the
postmodern dogma against said dogma).[30]
Actually,
what Phillips is describing here is a belief that characterized modern
philosophy before postmodern philosophy ever came along. Subjectivity with its relativism is the hallmark of modern philosophy.
More precisely, the reason “the postmodern mind” on its part “dogmatizes
against anyone claiming dogmatically to possess the truth” is not because truth
is subjective and relative, as if this comes about through or is only
distinctive to postmodernity. That is, we must distinguish between the modern
claim, “truth is subjective and relative because it is centered in the mind of
the subject and cannot be verified against external reality,” from the
postmodern claim, “truth is subjective and relative because it is centered in
the collective mind of a culture or language and cannot be verified against
external reality because such does not
exist.” Though closely related in undermining truth and similarly relative
in outlook, they are still different claims. The first still recognizes a
foundation in reality, though it denies any reliable way of knowing it. The
second denies such a foundation altogether. This is why the latter claims
“there is no center” or “no foundation” or that “language speaks us.” The latter is held to be true because language has no
metaphysical reference, any more than there is some ultimate meaning behind
humanity or existence.
A second problem with Phillips’
representation of the modern-postmodern framework is that he does not distinguish
precisely what failed when the modernist hope was shattered by the world wars
of the twentieth century. The hope, metaphysically speaking, was that beginning
with ourselves as humans (without reliance on God) we could redeem the world,
find the ultimate answers in life, discover and establish our own ethical
standards, etc. Truly, that hope failed as it was destined to do from the start
because of its rejection of God. However, in more mundane matters, the hope
that through reason, observation, and evidence we could as humans make progress
in other areas (such as science, medicine, and technology) did not and certainly has not failed. The problem with modernity’s
approach to truth is not the use of reason, observation, and evidence per se. (Scripture itself employs these
things to support faith.) However, it is when such things become an idol or
displace the biblical God that there is a problem. In sum, what failed about
modernity was its proud, metaphysical quest to find ultimate meaning, value,
and redemption for the human race apart from God. That the historical period
known as “the Enlightenment” thus so grievously misused reason, observation,
etc., in the process of “advancement” does not mean that these things (reason,
observation, etc.) are themselves essentially bad or suspicious, particularly
(in this context) with respect to the biblical case God himself has made for
the truth of the gospel.
A third problem occurs with
Phillips’ statement, “Christians may be cobelligerent with postmodernity’s assaults
against modernism.”[31]
What about Christians being cobelligerent with modernism against certain
postmodern tenets—such as, that contra postmodernism there is truth and that
reason and evidence are important in arriving at it? Phillips also quotes Carson who rejoices over
postmodernism’s “launching very heavy artillery against the modernity which,
across four centuries, developed in such a way that increasingly it taunted
confessional Christianity” (p. 10). But how did postmodernism assault modernism?
By a denial of the reality of truth itself—by claiming, as already stated, “All
our truths are fictions.” Is this helpful to the Christian faith? When
postmodernism (as Carson says) challenges modernism’s arrogance for insisting
“that human reason is the final arbiter of truth” (p. 10), unsurprisingly it
renders reason as empty or fictional in its exercise as the truth it seeks.
What is there to rejoice in here? That modernism misused reason in its
God-denying self-worship is undoubtedly true. But, again, does the sinister misuse of something entail that it is itself
sinister? And in an age increasingly irrational, shouldn’t Christians, for
example, follow the lead of the apostles of Christ (as demonstrated in The Acts of the Apostles) and take care
to honor the use of reason, observation, and evidence in persuading unbelievers
of the truth of the gospel?
This is, to my mind, what is wrong
with Carson’s comparing an alliance with postmodernism to the Western Allies’
pact with Communist Russia against Nazi Germany in World War II. The analogy
breaks down because in that context as long as Nazi Germany was defeated, it
did not matter who the Allies worked with to get this done. But if Communist
Russia had somehow made its conflict with Nazi Germany an occasion to also and
at the same time defeat the Allies, an alliance with them obviously would not
have been a good thing. This is what I see occurring with postmodernism’s
attack on modernity.[32]
In denying that there is transcendent truth, postmodernism is equally concerned
to defeat religions like Christianity which believe in such. If we truly
understand what postmodernism is about, we will realize that there is nothing
in its basic tenets to celebrate,
side with, or enlist to defeat modernity.[33]
Both modernism’s autonomy and rejection of God and Scripture and
postmodernism’s denial of ultimate reality are enemies to the Christian faith.
A fourth problem in Phillips’
representation of the modern-postmodern framework occurs when he says,
Almost incidentally, postmodernism has also
criticized Christian thought. D.A. Carson has catalogued a number of strengths
in the postmodern critique, even when it is applied to recent evangelical
approaches to theology and apologetics.[34]
Here, it seems to me,
Phillips fundamentally misunderstands the postmodern stance to Christianity.
Postmodernism’s agenda is nothing less than to think out the implications of
“the death of God.” And one of the most important influences behind that agenda
is Friedrich Nietzsche who clearly identifies which God supposedly
“died”—namely, the Christian God. It is true that the deconstruction of
logocentrism one finds in philosophers like Derrida is certainly much broader,
even more philosophical, than the Christian God. But it certainly includes any
logocentrism, including the eternal Logos of God who upholds both the world of
matter and meaning. Again, Nietzsche adamantly insists that all philosophical
efforts to establish morality or ultimate meaning in life are merely the
“shadows” of the Judeo-Christian God (whose existence he rejects).
Postmodernism’s criticism of Christian thought, therefore, is not even almost “incidental” but central to its task. (If one is inclined
to doubt this, I suggest inquiring of Christians who have been in secular
graduate programs with a specialization in Continental philosophy.)
A fifth and final problem occurs
when Phillips says,
Even when modern-thinking Christians have
sought to use rationalism to support the Bible’s teaching, thoughtful
Christians have found that the rationalist approach to absolute truth lines up
poorly with Christian humility, charity, and our teaching about the human
problem of sin. As the Christian witness has moved into the twenty-first
century, therefore, we have rightly sought to distance ourselves from the
rationalism of modernity.[35]
First,
I wonder: who are these “modern-thinking Christians” to which Phillips refers?
What books have they written? What have they said that supports modernism? Is
Phillips clear about what modernism is and what its true problems are in
relation to the Christian faith? Is he talking about people like C. S. Lewis,
Francis Schaeffer, Lee Strobel, Norman Geisler, and Ravi Zacharias? What
practical or concrete behavior demonstrates what it means for us as Christians
to “distance ourselves from the rationalism of modernity”? Certainly, we should
distance ourselves from modernity’s God-denying reliance on reason but is that
the same thing as distancing ourselves from reason
itself in presenting the biblical case for Jesus of Nazareth as the
Messiah?
Second, as I intend in what follows
to defend the apostolic use of reason and evidence in preaching and
establishing the truth of the gospel, I will sort out later the difference
between an apostolic, holy boldness in making the case for Jesus as the Messiah
and the unholy and arrogant “rationalism of modernity.” It will be sufficient
to say here that when Jesus says, “Heaven and earth will pass away but my words
will not pass away” (Matthew 24:35), he is implying, for one thing, that no
matter what philosophical trends are in the air either in the first or twenty-first
century, both the biblical case for his Messiahship and its method of
presentation (inclusive of preaching and reasoning with unbelievers as both he
and the apostles exemplified, respectively, in the Gospels and Acts) remains
the same for all places and times. Christian humility is measured not by human
standards based on issues for knowing invented by philosophy (particularly, as
mixed with the teachings of Christianity) but by the fear of the Lord and a
self-distrusting submission in every respect (including epistemology) to his holy
Word.
[1] As it is reasonable to assume that among the
members of TGC council there were disagreements on the topic of truth and since
Phillips’ booklet intends to represent not merely Phillips himself but the
entire council, I trust my readers will bear in mind that when I refer to
Phillips, I am not talking about him personally (his personal views or way of
handling this topic) but about TGC he represents. Also, this booklet currently may be purchased at Amazon.com or obtained free online as a downloadable pdf.
[2] Can We
Know the Truth?, pp. 22-23. Please note that my claim about what is found
in Phillips’ booklet is implied by the absence within its pages, for the most
part, of any positive prescription for bold preaching to or reasoning with
postmodernists about the truth of the gospel.
[6] One obvious example of this is Tim Keller’s
outstanding and important work, Reason
for God. My understanding is that much of the material for this book
originated from Keller’s responding to questions from (and reasoning with)
unbelievers in meetings specifically designed for that very purpose.
[7] In his Think:
The Life of the Mind and the Love of God, TGC council member John Piper
seems to recognize this universal aspect of truth in several places, for
instance, when in contrast to this aspect he characterizes relativism as the
belief that “there is no objective, external standard for measuring the truth
or falsehood of a statement” (p. 97). Also, in a message entitled, “The
Challenge of Relativism,” Piper says: “The claim that there is no one standard for truth
and falsehood that is valid for everyone is rooted most deeply in the desire of
the fallen human mind to be free from all authority and to enjoy the exaltation
of self.” Additionally, in What Ever Happened to Truth?, TGC council
member Al Mohler writes, “It [the truth of the gospel] is objectively,
historically, and universally true” (p. 59). Now this may be a misunderstanding
on my part, but I think this means that Mohler believes that in some sense even
unbelievers can understand the gospel even if they reject or disobey what they
know.
[8]As those familiar with Western philosophy are
probably aware, the coherence theory of truth is generally regarded,
particularly in its influence on contemporary thought, as originating with
epistemological idealists in the modern tradition like Immanuel Kant. In his
phenomenal-noumenal distinction, for instance, Kant believes we can only know
things as they appear to us (the phenomenal) and not how they are in themselves
(the noumenal). That is, we have no direct access to external (non-mental)
reality. This means that there is no objective truth which is accessible to us
as knowledge. Reality is conditioned by the mind such that all we have are
relative and subjective perspectives or interpretations and never direct
knowledge of reality itself. Put another way, knowledge is mediated through the
mind and there is no way to verify that knowledge, thus mediated, actually
corresponds to (or accords with) external reality. Hence, the emphasis with
respect to truth becomes a matter of how beliefs hold together or cohere (as an
internal, mental reality) rather than how they are or are not true to external
or objective reality.
[9] This quotation is from the statement on
truth at TGC website.
[15] In the end, Phillips’ recommendation that we
simply hand someone a Bible implies that in relating the gospel to a postmodern
unbeliever we actually do not answer these questions about the Bible’s
authority or the objectivity of truth.
[21] Douglas Groothuis, Truth Decay: Defending Christianity Against the Challenges of
Postmodernism, p. 152.
[29] If anything, this appears to be a
theological projection on postmodern thought.
[32] We also should not assume that much of the
scientific world (as reflective of modernism), for instance, has ever paid that
much attention to postmodernism.
[33] To be clear, I agree with Carson that
postmodernism (I would suggest: as a latter day development of modernism)
offers an important insight about how our subjective circumstances (history,
culture, language, etc.) influence our perception of truth. But it is important
to stress in our postmodern or relativistic times that objective truth can be
known, that these factors do not absolutely or exhaustively determine the
possibilities for what can be known.
